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1. Introduction 
The problem of the network security is taken up since eighties (Denning et al., 1987) and is 
developed up today (Beltilch et al., 2004, Bera, 2010, Dasgupta, 1999, Basile, 2007, Wilson, 
1999). A major problem of automatic intrusion detection is that, it is difficult to make a 
difference between normal and abnormal user behaviour.  Intrusion detection system 
should not only recognise the previously known patterns of attacks, but also react in case of 
appearance of the new events that violate the network security policy. The distributed 
nature of the task of the network security monitoring requires applying of the distributed 
tools for network security maintaining. The most important postulate addressed to the 
intrusion detection systems is that, such systems should automatically react in case of 
detecting the security policy breach to prevent the attack execution or to reduce the potential 
loss in the network systems. Intrusion detection systems should be equipped with the 
components responsible for the permanent observation of the states of monitored nodes and 
components that integrate the results of these observations and diagnose the security level 
of the system (Kolaczek et al., 2005, Nguyen et al., 2006).  
A comprehensive survey of anomaly detection systems is presented in (Patcha & Park, 2007) 
and a comparison of different approaches to intrusion detection systems is given in (Bejtlich, 
2004). One of the first agent systems for network security monitoring has been proposed in 
works (Balasubramaniyet et al., 1998, Spafford & Zamboni, 2000). In work (Kolaczek et al., 
2005) a framework of an original proposal of the intrusion detection system based on the 
multi-agent approach was presented. In particular, the architecture of such a system and the 
task of agents were specified. Proposed ideas were further developed and in work (Nguyen 
et al., 2006) the problem of anomalies detection on the basis of the nodes traffic analysis was 
discussed.  The proposal of the method for Denial of Service Attack detection was given in 
(Prusiewicz, 2008a).  
In this work we propose a novel framework of a multi-agent system for anomaly detection. 
The originality of our solution consists of applying the social network approach to Man in 
the Middle Attack (MITM) detection in a network system. Our proposal is based on the 
social networks discovery and their characteristics measurement to detect anomalies in 
network traffic. We assume that network communication between nodes constitutes social 
network of users and their applications, so the appropriate methods of social network 
formal analysis can be applied. The other important assumption is that values of these social 
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network parameters for a given node and their distribution for all nodes tend to be constant 
under normal conditions (Golbeck, 2005, Jamali, 2006, Park, 2007). 
We measure the values of the parameters that describe the social network consisted of the 
nodes and then verify whether the communication patterns between the members of the 
social network have been violated. The organization of the remaining part of this chapter is 
as follows. In Section 2 the social networks and the properties of social network are 
introduced. Then in section 3 the architecture of the multi-agent monitoring system is given. 
In section 4 the problem of anomaly detection in a social network is taken up. In particular 
the general schema of anomaly detection procedure is given, the case study of man-in-the-
middle attack is carried and the method for this type of attack detection is proposed. 
2. Social networks 
The basic idea about social networks is very simple. It could be understood as a social 
structure made of actors which can be represented as network nodes (which are generally 
individuals or organizations) that are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, 
such as values, visions, idea, financial exchange, friends, kinship, dislike, conflict, trade, web 
links, etc. The resulting structures are often very complex (Butts, 2008, Jamali, 2006, Golbeck 
, 2005). Social relationships in terms of nodes and ties among them could be used in various 
types of analysis. A number of academic researches have shown that dependences form 
social fields play a critical role also in many other fields and could be used in determining 
the way problems could be solved. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The example of social network structure (Batchelor, 2010) 
Better understanding of social networks requires a complete and rigorous description of a 
pattern of social relationships as a necessary starting point for analysis. The most convenient 
situation is when we have complete knowledge about all of the relationships between each 
pair of actors in the population. To manage all pieces of information related to social 
network the mathematical and graphical techniques have been used. This formal apparatus 
allows us to represent the description of networks compactly and systematically. In this 
context, social network analysts use two kinds of tools from mathematics to represent 
information about patterns of ties among social actors: graphs and matrices. 
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Network analysis uses one kind of graphic display that consists of nodes to represent 
community members and edges to represent ties or relations. There are two general types of 
situation when there are a single type of relations among the community members and 
more than one kind of relation. The first one can be represented by the simplex graph while 
in the second case we use multiplex graphs.  Additionally, each social tie or relation 
represented by graph may be directed or undirected (tie that represents cooccurrence, co-
presence, or a bonded-tie between the pair of community members). Another important 
feature related to the social networks and their graph representation is the strength of ties 
among community members. In a graph it may be one of the following types: nominal or 
binary (represents presence or absence of a tie); signed (represents a negative tie, a positive 
tie, or no tie); ordinal (represents whether the tie is the strongest, next strongest, etc.); or 
valued (measured on an interval or ratio level).  
Other basic social network proprieties that can be formally described and so can constitute a 
good background for analysis of community dynamics and which can be applied to detect 
various types of security breaches are as follows (Scott , 2000):  
• The Connections between nodes 
The number of immediate connections may be critical in explaining how community 
members view the world, and how the world views them, so it could be also important 
factor while modelling trust relations within community. The number and kinds of ties 
are a basis for similarity or dissimilarity to other community members the direction of 
connections may be helpful to describe the role of the community member in the 
society, it can be "a source" of ties, "a sink", or both. 
 
  
Fig. 2. A network with large number of connection between nodes (a) and small number of 
connections (b) 
• The size of a network 
The size of a network is indexed simply by counting the number of nodes, critical 
element for the structure of social relations because of the limited resources and 
capacities that each community member has for building and maintaining ties. The size 
of a network also influences trust relations while in bigger group it is easier to preserve 
anonymity and it is more difficult to evaluate trust values. 
• The density of a social network 
The density of a social network is defined as the number of existing connections 
divided by the number of maximum possible connections. The number of logically 
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possible relationships grows exponentially as the number of actors increases linearly. In 
communities with greater value of density parameter it should be easier to maintain 
relations between nodes as we get more information about the other community 
members. 
 
 
Fig. 3. High density social network (Morrison, 2008) 
• The degree of a network node 
It tells us how many connections a community member has. Where out-degree is the 
sum of the connections from the community member to others and in-degree is the sum 
of the connections to the particular community member from others. Out-degree and 
in-degree are also referred as fan-out and fan-in parameters. This type of parameter has 
been proved to be invariant for a long time periods and different scales (subnet sizes) or 
traffic types (protocols) of data flows in communication networks (Allmanz, 2005). 
Experiments showed that both Fan-in and Fan-out for a given node and their 
distribution for all nodes tend to be constant under normal conditions. While network is 
affected by some type of attack the structure of communication is often heavily affected 
and the distribution changes. There is also a detectible dependence between type of the 
attack and communication pattern disturbance (Kohler, 2002). At the other hand, 
community members that receive information from many sources may also be more 
powerful community members. However, these nodes could also suffer from 
"information overload" or "noise and interference" due to contradictory messages from 
different sources. Impact for the social relations between nodes is similar to that 
described in a case of density, dependently from in/out-degree when an individual has 
more or less information about its neighbourhood. 
• The reachability of community members 
A community member is "reachable" by another if there exists any set of connections by 
which we can find link from the source to the target entity, regardless of how many 
others fall between them. If some community members in a network cannot reach 
others, there is the potential of a division of the network. For example, disconnected 
community members could have more problems to evaluate trust value.  
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Fig. 4. The examples of networks with different node degree parameter values (a) Perfect 
graph of n nodes with avg. node degree n-1. (b) Star graph of n+1 nodes with avg. node 
degree (2n)/(n+1)  
• The transivity of network nodes connections  
The transitivity principle holds that, if A is tied to B, and B is tied to C, then A should be 
tied to C. The triadic relationships (where there are ties among the actors) should tend 
toward transitivity as an equilibrium condition. One of the most important type of 
social relation as trust is not strictly transitive and so this propriety not necessarily 
influences trust evaluation process. 
• The distance between the network nodes 
An aspect of how individuals are embedded in networks, two actors are adjacent when 
the distance between them is one. How many community members are at various 
distances from each other can be important for understanding the differences among 
community members in the constraints and opportunities they have as a result of their 
network location. Community members located more far apart from each other in the 
community have more problems with establishing new relations than the members, 
which are close. 
• The geodesic distance between the network nodes 
The geodesic distance is defined as the number of relations in the shortest possible walk 
from one community member to another. Many algorithms in network analysis assume 
that community members will use the geodesic path when communicating with each 
other.  
• The diameter of a network 
The diameter of a network is the largest geodesic distance in the connected network 
which tells us how "big" the community is, in one sense quantity in that it can be used 
to set an upper bound on the lengths of connections that we study. 
• The cohesion of a social network 
The degree to which nodes are connected directly to each other by communication 
links. Count the total connections between actors more strong connection between 
community members should determine grater trust values. 
• Centrality, Power, Betweenness 
Centrality, closeness, betweenness describe the locations of individuals in terms of how 
close they are to the "center" of the action in a network – though there are a few 
different definition of what it means to be at the canter. The more important community 
member is, the more important its opinions should be. 
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Fig. 5. Example of betweenness centrality. Red colour indicates the lowest betweenness 
centrality value and blue the highest (Bailin, 2009) 
 
 
Fig. 6. Cliques example. Network with two cliques – first one is composed of nodes: 
A,G,H,J,K,M, the second: D,E,F,L 
• The eigenvector of the geodesic distances 
An effort to find the most central community members in terms of the "global" or "overall" 
structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more "local" 
• The cliques in the network 
A subset of community members who are more closely tied to each other. A clique 
typically is a subset of community in which every node is connected to every other 
node of the group and which is not part of any other clique. Idea of cliques within a 
network is a powerful tool for understanding social structure and the embeddedness of 
individuals. Cliques reflect the groups of community members with strong relationship. 
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So, sudden change in communication pattern within such a group may be related to 
security breaches. 
• The clustering coefficient 
The probability that two nearest neighbours of a given node are also neighbours of each 
other. The value of clustering coefficient provides a quantitative measure for cliques in 
communication graph. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Example of clustering coefficients (cc) for different networks. a) cc=1, b) cc=0.3, c) cc=0 
3. The architecture of the multi-agent monitoring system 
It is assumed that there are two layers in the architecture of the multi-agent monitoring 
system: monitoring layer and control layer (Fig. 8). Monitoring layer consists of the nodes 
that are monitored by the monitoring agents. While control layer consists of the security 
control agents that are responsible for collecting data from monitoring agents and 
determining general characteristics of the network traffic in the monitored region. These 
characteristics describe communication patterns in the monitored region. We assume that 
communicating nodes constitutes the social network. Each security control agent is 
responsible for controlling one region (social network).  
The patterns of discovered social networks are temporally collated by security control 
agents with communication patterns stored in security control agents private databases in 
order to verify if any security policy breach has been occurred. 
 
M onitoring  layer
Socia l netw orks
C A 1
C A 2
C A 3 C ontrol layer
 
Fig. 8. Two-layers multi-agent monitoring system architecture 
Before the internal organization of the monitoring and security control agents will be given, 
let us denote: V as the set of the nodes, { }1 2 k KV v ,v , ,v , ,v= … … , K N∈ , MA  
www.intechopen.com
 Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
88 
( { }1 2 k KMA MA ,MA , ,MA , MA= … … ) as the set of the monitoring agents, SA  
( { }g1 2 GSA SA ,SA , ,SA , SA= … … ), G N∈  as the set of security control agents, SN  
( { }g gSN SN : SN V= ⊆ ) as the set of the social networks (monitoring regions) and { }1 2 ZP P ,P , ,P= …  as the set of the observed parameters describing the nodes from V. 
3.1 Monitoring agent’s internal organization 
Each monitoring agent kMA MA∈  observes the states of one node from V  in their 
monitoring regions (social networks) from SN  with the reference to the values of the 
parameters from the set P. The results of the observations are captured in their private set of 
observations.  
Definition 1.  A single observation of agent MAk is stored as a tuple [Prusiewicz, 2008a]:  
 ( )( )k j nO P ,x , t kDB∈  (1) 
where: jP P∈ , nt T∈  and T is the universe of the timestamps and DBk denotes the database 
of the agent MAk.  
Such observation refers to the situation that at the timestamp nt  the agent 
kMA has 
observed in the node kv the value of the parameter jP equals x.  
3.2 Security control agents internal organization 
Security control agents control the monitoring regions.  The size of the monitoring regions 
may change by adding or removing nodes as a consequence of the social networks 
evolutions. Security control agent gSA , gSA SA∈ is built from three modules: Data Storage 
Module, Social Network Module and Security Control Module. Security control agent gSA  
collects data from databases of the monitoring agents and builds communication matrix in 
Data Storage Module [Prusiewicz, 2008b]. 
Definition 2.  The communication matrix gCM is defined as: 
 [ ]g mn GxGCM a=  (2) 
where mna is the set of time stamps of communication acts between nodes  mv  and nv . The 
node mv is a  sender and nv - receiver. 
 
       
      
       
       
       
 a212    
       
 
 
    (t2, t5, t9, t23, t28, t34) 
 
a217 a213 
a175 
v31 v17 
 
v13 
 
v12 
 
v5 
 
v2 
 
v1 
v31 
v17 
v13 
v12 
v5 
v2 
v1 
 
Table 1. En example of communication matrix: the node v2 communicated with the node v12 
at the timestamps: t2, t5, t9, t23, t28, t34 
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On the basis of data from communication matrix gCM the values of the parameters 
describing the social network gSN , gSN SN∈ are determined in Social Network Module. 
Additionally in Social Network Module the patterns of communication between nodes are 
determined that a are the basis for the social networks discovery. In Security Control 
Module the procedures for anomalies detections are implemented. In this case the 
procedure for Man-In-The Middle attack is implemented. 
3.3 Determining of the social network characteristics  
Social network characteristics are determined on the basis of the data from communication 
matrix gCM by the Social Network Module. In this module two data structure are used in 
order to control the security of the monitoring region: Social Network Patterns and 
Temporal Communication Patterns defined as follows: 
Definition 3.  A Social Network Patterns is defined as: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]b e b e b e b ei i i ib e
t ,t t ,t t ,t t ,tg
in ,v out ,v v vt ,t
SNP f ,f ,cl ,c=  (3) 
where: 
- [ ]b e
i
t ,t
in ,vf  is the number of nodes that originate data exchange with node vi during 
observation period [tb, te] 
- [ ]b e
i
t ,t
out ,vf  is the number of nodes to which vi initiates conversations during observation 
period [tb, te] 
- [ ]b e
i
t ,t
vcl  is the clustering coefficient defined according to the following equation: 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
b e
b e
i b e b e
[t ,t ]
i
[t ,t ]
v [t ,t ] [ t ,t ]
i i
2 E G1 v
cl
deg v deg v 1
= −  (4) 
where:  
- [ ]b e
i
t ,t
in ,vf  is the number of nodes that originate data exchange with node vi during 
observation period [tb, te] 
- deg( b e[t ,t ]iv ) – denotes degree of node vi during observation period [tb, te] 
- G1( b e[t ,t ]iv ) – is the set of nodes which are connected with vi via single link (its 
immediate neighbors) during observation period [tb, te] 
- E(G1( b e[ t ,t ]iv ))| – is the number of edges among nodes in 1–neighbourhood of node vi 
during observation period [tb, te]  
- [ ]b e
i
t ,t
vc   is the centrality of the node, it describes the temporal location of the node vi 
during observation period [tb, te] in terms of how close it is to the "canter" of the action 
in a network.  
There are four measures of centrality that are widely used in network analysis: degree 
centrality, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. The proposed method uses 
Eigenvector centrality measure which assigns relative scores to all nodes in the network 
based on the principle that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of 
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the node in question than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. For examle Google's 
PageRank is a variant of the Eigenvector centrality measure (Page, 1998). For the node vi the 
centrality score is proportional to the sum of the scores of all nodes which are connected to it 
within observation period [tb, te]: 
 [ ]b e b e b e b e
i
[ t ,t ]b e
N
t ,t [ t ,t ] [ t ,t ] [t ,t ]
v j i , j j
j 1j M (i )
1 1
c v A vλ λ =∈
= =∑ ∑  (5) 
where:  
- [ t ,t ]b eM (i) is the set of nodes that are connected to the node vi during observation period 
[tb, te], 
- N is the total number of nodes,  
- b e[t ,t ]i , jA  is the adjacency matrix of the network during observation period [tb, te], 
- λ is a constant. 
Definition 4. A Temporal Communication Patterns is the set of social network 
characteristics that has been determined at the time intervals, defined as: 
 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
b e b e b e b e
' ' ' ' i i i ib e b e
g g g [t ,t ] [ t ,t ] [t ,t ] [ t ,t ]
in ,v out ,v v v[t ,t ] [t ,t ]
TCP TCP TCP f ,f ,cl ,c= =  (6) 
where each element of the set gTCP has the same structure as Social Network Patterns. The 
difference is that the values of [ ]b e
g
t ,t
SNP  are the patterns that describe the monitored social 
network gSN ( gSN V⊆ ). They are discovered on the basis of the historical network traffic 
data analysis. Social Network Patterns  are used to discover any security policy breaches in a 
network system. While the values from Temporal Communication Patterns describe the 
current communication characteristics of monitored region. The last element of the gTCP is 
a current characteristics of communication patterns of a social network gSN . 
Having the values of the parameters from Social Network Patterns and current social 
network characteristics the procedure for anomaly detection might be applied. 
 
Set of agent MAk 
observations  
:
Ok(v2,(P2,x1),t3)
Ok(v2,(P1,x2),t3)
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...
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2
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2
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2
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Fig. 9. The process of determining of the social network characteristics and anomaly detection 
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On the fig. 9 the process of anomaly detection carried out by the security control agent is 
illustrated. First the observations from the monitoring agents embodied in the nodes v6, v7, 
v8, v9 are captured by the Data Storage Module and used to determine communication 
matrix 2CM . Data from 2CM are sent to Social Network Module, responsible for 
determining the patterns of communications in an observed network. The social network 
patterns 
5 35
2
[t ,t ]SNP have been determined for the nodes: v6, v7, v8, v9 and the time interval 
5 35[t , t ]  to control the security. The current communication patterns 
2TCP are compared 
with 
5 35
2
[t ,t ]SNP  to control the security of 
2SN . 
4. Man-in-the-middle attack detection 
The man-in-the-middle attack (often abbreviated MITM) is a form of active eavesdropping 
in which the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages 
between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a 
private connection when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker. To 
perform the effective attack, the attacker must be able to intercept all messages going 
between the two victims and inject new ones, which is straightforward in many 
circumstances (Fields, 1995). 
This type of attack can be as analyzed as a general problem resulting from the presence of 
intermediate parties acting as proxy for clients on either side (Asokan, 2002, Shim, 2003, 
Welch, 2003). The problems related to the MITM attacks are also related to trust relation 
among geographically distributed subjects. If communicating with each other subjects are 
trustworthy and competent the risk of the MITM attack is low. If communicating parts do 
not know each other or has no trust relation, the risk of the attack increases. By acting as 
proxy and appearing as the trusted client to each side, the intermediate attacker can carry 
out much mischief, including various attacks against the confidentiality or integrity of the 
data passing through it. So, one of the most urgent question is how one can detect MITM 
attacks.  
It is important to notice, that MITM attack is a general security problem not only related to 
cryptographic applications. An example of such non-cryptographic man-in-the-middle 
attack was caused by one version of a Belkin wireless network router in 2003 (Leyden, 2003).  
This router periodically would take over an HTTP connection being routed through it: it 
would fail to pass the traffic on to destination, but instead itself respond as the intended 
server. The reply it sent, in place of the requested web page, was an advertisement for 
another Belkin product. This 'feature' was removed from later versions of the router's 
firmware (Scott, 2000). 
Another example of such type of man-in-the-middle attack could be the "Turing porn 
farm". This schema of the attack potentially could be used by spammers to defeat 
CAPTCHAs (Petmail). The general idea is that the spammer sets up a pornographic web 
site where access requires that the user solves the CAPTCHAs in question. However, this 
attack is merely theoretical because there is no evidence of building Turing porn farm by 
the time being (Atwood, 2006). There are available several ready to use tools which 
implement the MITM idea and which can be used for communication interception in 
various environments, e.g. dsniff – a tool for SSH and SSL MITM attacks, Ettercap - a tool 
for LAN based MITM attacks, AirJack - a tool that demonstrates 802.11 based MITM 
attacks, and many others. 
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4.1 Evaluation of MITM event probability value 
We assume tracking four communication patterns: Fan-in (from here on denoted as 
i
t
in ,vf
Δ for 
node vi during the observation period tΔ ), Fan-out (
i
t
out ,vf
Δ ), clustering coefficient  (
i
t
vcl
Δ ) and 
centrality (
i
t
vc
Δ ).  
According to the assumption presented by (Allmanz, 2005) that these types of parameter has 
been proved to be invariant for a long time periods and different subnet sizes or traffic types 
of data flows, the risk of the MITM incident will be estimated as the abnormal change of the 
characteristic parameters values for a given social network member.  
Let us assume that the collected history record consists of a number of observations of Fan-
in values from some starting point up to current time t. So we have 1
i
t
in ,vf
Δ , 2
i
t
in ,vf
Δ , 3
i
t
in ,vf
Δ ,…, k
i
t
in ,vf
Δ .  
Now, consider the Fan-in as a random variable 
iin ,v
F . Thus, ( 1
i
t
in ,vf
Δ , 2
i
t
in ,vf
Δ , 3
i
t
in ,vf
Δ ,…, k
i
t
in ,vf
Δ ) is a 
sample of size k of 
iin ,v
F . We also assume all of the 
i
t
in ,vf
Δ to be independent. It is commonly 
known that the mean value and the variance of 
iin ,v
F   can be estimated by using the 
following formulae: 
 F ji i
k
t
in ,v in ,v
j 1
1
f
m
Δ
=
= ∑  (7) 
 
iin,v
S j ii
k
t 2
in ,vin ,v
j 1
1
(f F )
k 1
Δ
=
= −− ∑  (8) 
F iin ,v  and iin,vS  are thus the estimations (based on the data being at our disposal) of mean 
value and the variance of 
iin ,v
F . Obviously the bigger our sample is, the better they 
approximate E(
iin ,v
F ) (expected value of  random variable)
iin ,v
F  and Var(
iin ,v
F ) (variance of  
random variable 
iin ,v
F )  respectively. From this point we assume that the observations 
‘number is big enough to state that E(
iin ,v
F ) and Var(
iin ,v
F ) are known.  
Let also E(
iout ,v
F ) and Var(
iout ,v
F ) for the Fan-out, as well as E(
i
t
vcl
Δ ) and Var(
i
t
vcl
Δ ) for 
clustering coefficient and  centrality  E(
i
t
vc
Δ ) , Var(
i
t
vc
Δ ) be defined in the same way. 
In our approach, we will detect the possible MITM events by evaluation of some weighted 
value related to mean value and variance of fan-in, fan-out, clustering coefficient and 
centrality. At this stage of research we assume that we will analyze all four parameters 
independently. This means that it is enough to assume MITM incident if only one of the 
parameters exceeds threshold value. 
From the Chebyshev's inequality we can estimate the upper bound of the probability that 
F x− is greater than kS. Where F  and S are mean value and the variance of X, while X 
denotes the random variable related to x (in this case one of the following: 
i
t
in ,vf
Δ ,
i
t
out ,vf
Δ ,
i
t
vc
Δ ,
i
t
vcl
Δ ).  
According to this estimation the probability expectation E (
iv
ϖ ) value of the MITM event 
for a given parameter will be evaluated using the following formula: 
 
iv 2
1
E( ) 1
k
ω α= −  (9) 
Where α is a coefficient, which value should be set during a process of tuning-up the 
detection system to the real network conditions. Parameter k is defined as follows: 
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F x
1 if 1
S
k F x
F x
S if 1
S
⎢ ⎥− <⎧ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥= −⎨ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ −⎪ ≥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (10) 
4.2 The procedure of the Man-in-the-middle attack detection  
Our approach of MITM attack detection has been dedicated especially to effectively detect 
automated attacks of this type. For example this method should be convenient for detection 
HoneyBot-based attacks as it has been described in their work by researchers from Institut 
EURECOM in France (Lauinger, 2010), who are working on automation of social 
engineering attacks on social networks. 
French researchers have developed an automated social engineering tool that uses a man-in-
the middle attack and strikes up online conversations with potential victims. In the work 
(Lauinger, 2010) the proof-of-concept HoneyBot has been presented that poses convincingly 
as a real human in Internet Relay Chats (IRC) and instant messaging sessions. It lets an 
attacker collect personal and other valuable information from victims via these chats, or 
tempt them into clicking on malicious links. The researchers had proved the feasibility and 
effectiveness of their MITM attack variant. During the tests they were able to get users to 
click onto malicious links sent via their chat messages 76 percent of the time. 
We propose the following idea of algorithm for MITM detection using social network 
patterns. 
 
Input: D – set of data that can be used to derive and observe patterns of the social 
network (e.g. e-mail logs, chat rooms records, network traffic, etc.) 
Output: R∈{Y,N} – information about the social network state according to risk of 
MITM incidents 
BEGIN 
1. Take the data set D and derive the social network structure (e.g. using one of the 
approach presented in section 3.1) 
2. For each node find the current value of the monitored social network patterns (fan-
in, fan-out, centrality, clustering) 
3. Analyze the history of network patterns changes. 
As we treat the network patterns values as the realization of the random variable, 
mean value and variance will be calculated for each pattern. 
4. For each node compare the latest change of the patterns values to the assumed 
threshold value. 
5. If the result of the step 4 is that the observed parameter value exceeded the 
threshold, the value of the result variable is set to Y – the high risk of the MITM 
incident, otherwise it is set to N – small risk of MITM incident. 
6. Return to step 2. 
END 
Remarks: 
- due to the social network dynamics, we may consider some periodic more thorough 
updates of the network structure; it could be represented in the above algorithm by 
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adding a time related condition in step 6 and then by return to step 1 instead of 
returning to step 2 
- it is possible to consider situation when we are interested only in monitoring for one 
particular or some specific subset of all nodes (bank client, chat room participant, etc.), 
then we may investigate some additional information about its activity and use some 
data fusion methods to improve the accurateness of the final decision (e.g. we may 
concurrently track the node’s activity within several different social network and so 
build more comprehensive profile of the network identity). 
- we should consider if some “suspicious” behaviour in the context of the only one 
observed parameter is enough to assume MITM incident or we would prefer to wait for 
more premises or else we will combine the values of all parameters and only after using 
data fusion methods set up the final decision. 
The algorithm for MITM attack detection 
Input: Social Network Patterns 
b e
g
[t ,t ]SNP  
Temporal Network Patterns 
b' e'
g
[t ,t ]TNP  
Threshold values: 
iin ,v max
F − , iout ,v maxF − , iv maxC − , iv maxCl − . 
Output:       The risk of the MITM incidents in the nodes of gSN   
BEGIN 
1. For each node giv SN∈ determine the probability expectation values: in ,viFE( )ω , 
out ,vi
FE( )ω ,  viClE( )ω ,  viCE( )ω  according to the formula 9.  
2. If 
iin,v -max
F
in ,vi
FE( )ω > or iout,v -maxFout ,viFE( )ω > or iv -maxviClE( ) Clω > or iv -maxviCE( ) cω >  
then the risk of MITM incident in the node Vi: 
iv
R := {Y} else  
iv
R := {N} 
END 
5. Conclusion 
Generally the aim of the network security systems is to protect computational and 
communication resources from any security policy breaches. Such systems should be 
equipped with the meachnisms for permanent monitoring the values of the parameters 
describing their states in order to diangose and protect of their resources. The most 
important postulate addressed to the intrusion detection systems is that, such systems 
should automatically react in case of detecting the security policy breaches to prevent the 
attack executions or to reduce the potential loss in the network systems. Although the 
problem of the network security has been studied for decades and several methods and 
approaches have been proposed there is still open problem how to differentiate normal and 
abnormal states of the network system. In this work we proposed the social network 
approach to evaluate the security state of the network. The values of the chosen coefficients 
that characterise the users behaviour are used to discover security breaches occurrence. The 
idea of our proposal is as follows. First the user behaviours are monitored and the social 
networks are discovered. Then having the pattern values of social networks characteristics 
we are able to compare them with the current observations and detect any aberrances.   
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We proposed two-layers multi-agent system for security monitoring and the algorithm for 
MITM attack detection. 
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